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I.

INTRODUCTION

According to Justice Powell, the first amendment religion
clauses are the source of "some of the most perplexing questions"
that the Supreme Court confronts.1 In a long and rapidly expanding line of religion clause cases the Court has struggled, with a
conspicuous lack of success, to articulate principles of broad appli*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.S. 1964, Xavier University; J.D. 1967, University of Cincinnati; L.L.M. 1968, Harvard University.
**Associate, Goldstein and Price, St. Louis, Missouri. B.A. 1981, University of Florida;
J.D. 1984, Vanderbilt University.
1. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
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cability. The Court's efforts to date have resulted in a jumble of
tests, standards, and theoretical approaches from which predicting
the outcome in future cases is very difficult.
The conceptual problems that have frustrated the Court's attempts at doctrinal development center in two broad areas: first,
the meaning and effect of the establishment clause and second, the
relationship between the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause. In a third area, the meaning and effect of the free exercise
clause, the Court has had somewhat less trouble articulating a doctrinal approach, but even here the Court has not applied the doctrine consistently and has not reached entirely predictable results.
Perhaps the most telling measure of the Court's doctrinal frustration in the religion clause area is the extent to which it recently
has attempted to elevate its conspicuous lack of doctrinal consistency into an accepted methodology for decisionmaking. Chief Justice Burger summarized current thinking on the relationship between the two religion clauses by noting that there is "internal
tension in the First Amendment between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause." 2 Finding a clearer acknowledgement of the Court's failure to articulate a unifying theory underlying the two clauses would be difficult. Concerning the meaning and effect of the establishment clause, Chief Justice Burger has
observed with apparent approval (or at least resignation) that the
Court has been unwilling to tie establishment clause analysis to a
single test.3 With the same apparent approval, Justice White has

noted that "our decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches .... This course sacrifices clarity
and predictability for flexibility . . . ., Describing the same phe-

nomenon in another case, Justice O'Connor concluded that
"[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion."5 In effect, the Court seems to have accepted
the inevitability of an ad hoc approach with a final result in any
2. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971).
3. Lynch v. Donnally, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
4. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980);
see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon Court explained, "Every analysis
in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years." Id. at 612.
5. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In his dissent in Lynch v. Donnally, Justice Brennan characterized the Court's doctrinal approach somewhat less charitably: "It seems the Court is willing to alter its analysis from Term to Term in order to suit its
preferred results." Id. at 699 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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case possible only after Supreme Court review.
Perhaps the best that can be said for the Court's efforts over
the years is that the Court has achieved some groping, intuitive
consistency in results despite the inconsistencies both in the articulated rationales and in the application of those rationales. Because none of the articulated reasoning provides a firm theoretical
basis for all or even most of the decisions, the explanation for any
rough consistency must lie in intuitive policy concerns that are
only hinted at in the Court's various opinions. Chief Justice Burger
came close to this insight when he wrote that the purpose of the
religion clauses was "to state an objective, not to write a statute."6
The Court, however, has never authoritatively identified the objective the religion clauses were intended to state. The identification
of a single overriding objective for the two clauses would provide
the unifying theory required to assign consistent and coherent content to the two religion clauses and to dissolve the "tension" between the clauses. The thesis of this Article is that such a single
overriding objective can be identified and articulated. This objective reflects the basic purpose of those who authored and adopted
the religion clauses and, to a remarkable degree, harmonizes the
Court's apparently disparate results in religion clause cases. The
Court's conscious acceptance of the unifying theory proposed in
this Article would provide a satisfying explanation for a large number of results arrived at by intuition in the past and would provide
a theoretical basis from which to predict results in future cases.
II.

CURRENT RELIGION CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND THE SUGGESTED

UNIFYING THEORY

The highest level of doctrinal consistency is found in "pure"
free exercise cases-those cases involving a challenge to a direct
regulatory interference with recognized religious activity. Such legislative actions invariably call forth the strictest judicial scrutiny,
6. WaIz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The Court explained:
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the

most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but the purpose was to state an
objective, not to write a statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in the
opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping
utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular
cases but have limited meaning as general principles.
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usually referred to as the compelling interest test.' As the governmental interference with religion becomes less direct or more inadvertent, however, the Court applies a reduced level of judicial scrutiny through a variety of rhetorical constructs.8 Similarly, as the
regulated activity either becomes less central to religious observance or is identified with less well-recognized religions, the Court
reduces the level of judicial scrutiny through a number of rhetori9
cal or doctrinal formulae.
On the establishment clause side of the ledger, the Court's
working doctrines are much less clear and consistent. The Court
most often articulates as the criterion the tripartite test set forth
in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York. 10 Under the
Walz test, the Court evaluates a governmental action for purpose,
primary effect, and excessive entanglement."' This tripartite test is
far less rigorous in both articulation and application than the strict
judicial scrutiny the Court applies in the usual free exercise case,
but the Court never has provided a clear explanation for that significant doctrinal difference. Although the Court recites the tripartite test formula regularly, it seems to apply the formula inconsistently. As if the tripartite test were not flexible and amorphous
enough in itself, the Court occasionally articulates some different
test or no test at all to dispose of an establishment clause case."2
Finally, the Court seems to have accepted the notion that there
should be some sort of historic exception to what would otherwise
be a finding of unconstitutionality under the usual establishment
clause criteria.' 3
At the level of the doctrine articulated in these cases, the
Court's various approaches and results are impossible to reconcile.
7. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Although the applications of the
compelling interest test seem inconsistent, the language does not vary significantly. See infra text accompanying notes 25-44.
8. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
9. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
10. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
11. The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman stated what is known as the Walz test as follows: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971) (citations omitted).
12. E.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In Larson the Court applied strict
scrutiny in disposing of an establishment clause claim. See infra text accompanying notes
63-73 for a discussion of Larson.
13. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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As noted above, many members of the Court have acknowledged as
much. According to this Article, however, the various results
reached by the Court while using a variety of doctrinal approaches
are explainable in terms of a single unarticulated objective that has
guided the Court's actions in this area. Simply stated, the Court's
objective is to prevent or minimize political oppression of groups
defined by religious belief or conduct. In other words, whether the
case involves a free exercise challenge or an establishment challenge, the level of judicial intervention that results will be in direct
proportion to the risk of political oppression along religious lines.
When that risk is slight or nonexistent, judicial intervention will be
casual or nonexistent, no matter which of the many doctrinal constructs the Court chooses to articulate as the applicable standard
or test in the case. On the other hand, when the potential for political oppression along religious lines is great, the Court usually will
articulate and always will apply the strictest judicial scrutiny, no
matter which of the two clauses provides the source of the
challenge.
The Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny to free exercise cases but not to establishment cases is explained by the simple fact that free exercise cases more often present a greater threat
of political oppression of religion. A direct regulatory assault on
religious liberties constitutes the most serious and obvious political
oppression of religion. On the other hand, governmental "establishment" of some politically preferred religion by affording it governmental aid presents a noticeably less serious and less direct
threat of political oppression of the disfavored religions. The oppression present in this situation is not a direct interference with
the freedom to believe or act; the disparate treatment creates only
a burden of operating without the governmental aid available to a
competing religious belief. While such a competitive political disadvantage may be undesirable, the risk of oppression is usually remote compared to that involved in an immediate regulatory interference with religious freedom.
From this perspective, the "tension" between the religion
clauses dissolves, and the Court's decisions in "tension" cases become perfectly understandable. Generally speaking, these cases
present a situation with only two courses of action available to the
state. The first course of action would restrict or burden some religious belief or action. The other course would appear to aid, at
least indirectly, the religious belief or conduct in question. When
confronted with this choice, the Court routinely holds that the free
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exercise clause requires the second course of action even though
that course otherwise appears to violate the establishment clause.14
In view of the Court's determinative, albeit intuitive, concern for
the risk of political oppression of religion, this result is perfectly
predictable. Because a regulatory burden or restriction on religious
exercise presents a greater or more direct risk of political oppression than does governmental aid to religious exercise, the single
objective of the two religion clauses requires the choice of the aid
alternative. 15
Finally, this process of weighing the risk of political oppression on a case-by-case basis explains why the Court occasionally
has invoked a type of historic exception to what otherwise would
have been the applicable free exercise or establishment clause criteria. In these cases, the Court confronted a challenge to governmental action that had stood without serious question for many
years, in some instances dating back to the time of the adoption of
the Bill of Rights. While these governmental actions technically
did advance or restrict religion, the Court refused to strike them
down because they resulted in no serious risk of political oppression in actual effect. The results in these cases are simply not understandable in terms of the Court's articulated criteria in prior
cases. For example, it seems virtually impossible to find that the
use of a minister to open state legislative sessions with prayer does
not violate the establishment clause under the Walz tripartite test
of purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement.' 6 When the
Court insists on holding that such a practice does not violate the
establishment clause because of some historic exception, the Court
must be saying that, as a matter of historic experience, this particular practice has not led to political oppression on religious
14. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
15. In Walz the Court faced the choice of restraining religion through taxation or aiding religion through a tax exemption. Resolving the conflict in favor of an exemption, the
Court explained:
Either course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement

with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures,
and direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes.
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing
them.
397 U.S. at 674-75; see Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
16. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800-01 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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grounds.
The Court's occasional reviews of the history of the first
amendment confirm that the religion clauses are simply two sides
of the same conceptual coin and that the core concept is protection
against religious oppression by government. In Everson v. Board of
Education17 Justice Black observed that both Jefferson and
Madison pressed for the passage of the two religion clauses of the
first amendment in order to protect individual religious liberty. 18
Establishment of an official religion by government was simply one
particularly common form of interference with individual religious
liberty.' 9 Stated another way, any governmental interference with
religion necessarily would involve at least an implicit approval or
establishment of other beliefs or practices considered acceptable. 0
As Justice Black concluded after his review of the history of the
religion clauses, the framers decided that "individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any
or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious indi17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

18.

Id. at 13.

19. See generally L. PFEFFER,

CHURCH,

STATE AND FREEDOM (1953). Mr. Pfeffer has

noted:
The draftsmen of the First Amendment regarded freedom of religion as incompatible with an establishment. Nothing in American constitutional history or tradition justifies an apportionment of values between disestablishment and freedom or indeed the
dichotomy itself. The struggle for religious liberty and for disestablishment were parts
of the same single evolutionary process that culminated in the First Amendment.
Id. at 122.
20. Professor Tribe noted the fundamental interrelationship between the religion
clauses, although, like the Court, he stopped short of identifying the single underlying purpose of the two clauses:
Allocating religious choices to the unfettered consciences of individuals under the the
free exercise clause remains, in part, a means of assuring that church and state do not
unite to create the many dangers and divisions often implicit in such an established
union. Similarly, forbidding the excessive identification of church and state through the
establishment clause remains, in part, a means of assuring that government does not
excessively intrude upon religious liberty.
L. TRIE,AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 814-15 (1978) (footnotes omitted).

The second sentence of Tribe's parallel construction identifies the protection of religious liberty, which is the primary purpose of the free exercise clause, as one purpose of the
establishment clause. To complete what appears to be a clever parallel, he observes in his
first sentence that one purpose of the free exercise clause is to prevent "the many dangers"
of establishment, which he obviously suggests is the primary purpose of the establishment
clause. But what exactly are "the many danagers" of establishment? This Article argues
that Tribe's "many dangers" are no more and no less than a variety of threats to religious
liberty. Upon close inspection, Professor Tribe's suggestion of complimentary purposes for
the religion clauses collapses into the more fundamental observation that the two religion
clauses share precisely the same objective: preventing political oppression on religious lines.
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vidual or group."' 2 1 In his dissent in Everson Justice Rutledge also
articulated the tie between the establishment clause ban on aid of
religion and the concern for religious liberty. According to Justice
Rutledge's analysis, public financing of religious activity would
lead to competition for more public support. This political competition among religions would produce a politically dominant religion and the end of religious freedom-precisely what the establishment clause was designed to prevent.2 2
More recently, Justice O'Connor made the same basic point in
her concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, stating, "Although a
distinct jurisprudence has enveloped each of these clauses, their
common purpose is to secure religious liberty."2 Referring specifically to the establishment clause, Justice O'Connor stated, "The
task for the Court is to sort out those statutes and government
practices whose purpose and effect go against the grain of religious
'24
liberty protected by the First Amendment.
In effect, the free exercise clause and the establishment clause
should be read and applied as a single conceptual unit, a single
constitutional restriction on government. When the Court's deci21. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11. In discussing the establishment clause specifically, Justice
Black observed:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). The prohibitions
against government setting up a church, aiding one or all religions, or preferring one religion
over another are all purposes that traditionally are ascribed to the establishment clause.
The other purposes noted by Black, such as preventing government from forcing or barring
attendance at church and preventing government from forcing or punishing the profession
of particular religious beliefs, are purposes traditionally ascribed to the free exercise clause.
Yet Justice Black casually lumped them all together as purposes of the establishment
clause, apparently confusing the separate doctrinal contents that the Court has assigned to
each clause. Of course, Justice Black actually was acknowledging, consciously or unconsciously, that the single purpose of the two clauses was the prevention of political oppression along religious lines.
22. 330 U.S. at 53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
23. 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sions are analyzed from the perspective of a single "religion clause"
ban on excessive risk of political oppression, the intricate doctrinal
distinctions and apparent doctrinal inconsistencies largely fade
away.
III.

THE USUAL REGULATORY INFRINGEMENT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
THE GREATEST RISK OF POLITICAL OPPRESSION

The direct prohibition of a religious exercise because the government simply prefers or approves of a competing religious belief
is extremely rare in this country. Regulation of religious belief as a
matter of official religious preference would be a per se violation of
the free exercise clause 25 because political oppression of religion
would not be just a risk but an absolute certainty. This kind of
regulation would be precisely the sort of political oppression of religion for religious reasons that the framers specifically intended
the religion clauses to prevent. In a sense, such a regulation would
trigger the highest possible level of judicial scrutiny-a holding of
per se unconstitutionality. Indeed, the regulation also would be the
clearest sort of establishment clause violation, thus demonstrating
the two clauses' underlying unity of purpose. Similarly, formal governmental endorsement of a particular religious belief or practice
is fairly rare. Official endorsement of one religion, even without direct regulatory interference with competing religious beliefs, would
be a per se violation of the establishment clause.26
25. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
26. Although such cases are not common, it appears that the 1984-85 Term produced
two decisions that arguably fit this category. In Wallace v. Jaffree, a majority of the Court
held as a factual matter that the Alabama legislature enacted the challenged statute "for the
sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the
beginning of each school day." 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (1985). That finding of fact, vigorously
disputed in the dissents, led immediately to the conclusion that the statute contravened the
establishment clause.
In the second case, Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Court faced an establishment clause
challenge to a Connecticut statute requiring all employers to allow each employee to refuse
to work on the day designated by the employee as his or her religious Sabbath. 105 S. Ct.
2914 (1985). The Court described the statute as a state command "that Sabbath religious
concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace." Id. at 2918. Curiously, the Court articulated its establishment clause objections in terms of the "primary
effect" of the statute rather than in terms of the obvious purpose of the statute to advance
the religious practice of Sabbath observance. Id. Nonetheless, the general thrust of the unusually brief opinion, joined by an overwhelming majority of the Justices, seems to be a
finding of per se unconstitutionality on the grounds that the State's regulatory power was
used purposefully to advance particular religious interests over all competing interests. For
other examples of cases involving state actions purposefully designed to advance particular
religious beliefs or practices, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting of copies of
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The free exercise cases that actually reach the Court almost
always result from some governmental regulation intended to accomplish a secular purpose like public health, public order, or the
distribution of economic benefits. The interference with religion is
inadvertent or unintentional and occurs only because the regulated
conduct is in some instances religiously motivated.2 7 Similarly, the
establishment cases that reach the Court usually result from a governmental program intended to advance a secular objective such as
education. Any assistance that some religion receives from the program is the unintentional or inadvertent by-product of the government's attempt to advance its nonreligious objectives. The way the
Court approaches an inadvertent aid case, however, differs fundamentally from the way it approaches an inadvertent regulation
case. Generally speaking, a demonstration of secular purpose and
secular effect will save from establishment clause invalidity a governmental program that results in inadvertent aid to religion. 28 On
the other hand, such a showing will not save from free exercise
clause challenge a governmental regulation that inadvertently restricts the exercise of religious beliefs. For the regulation to survive
free exercise challenge, the government must show that the regulation is the least restrictive means available to pursue a compelling
governmental purpose. 29 As a practical matter then, the Court
reserves the highest level of judicial scrutiny for direct regulatory
interferences with religiously motivated conduct. These cases trigger the highest level of judicial scrutiny or demand the highest
level of justification from the state precisely because, aside from
per se violations, these regulations present the greatest risk of political oppression of religion.
The Court's analytical standard and its ultimate holding in
Wisconsin v. Yoder " exemplify the rigor with which the Court will
protect a religious minority against inadvertent state regulatory interference. Yoder concerned a challenge to Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law that required children to attend public or
the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms), and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968) (prohibition against teaching evolution in the public schools).
27. Such free exercise cases are inevitable in modern society. In Braunfeld v. Brown
the Court explained, "[It cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no
law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some
religious sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various religions."
366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 45-60.
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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private school until they reached age sixteen. Amish religious beliefs required that formal education stop after the eighth grade to
avoid excessive exposure to worldly influences. Justice Burger's
opinion in Yoder flatly states, "The essence of all that has been
said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. 31 Because the state
could not meet this heavy standard of justification, the Court held
that the application of the state's compulsory education law to
Amish children violated the free exercise clause. s2
Perhaps the most graphic demonstration of the Court's underlying concern about political oppression of religious minorities is
found in Sherbert v. Verner,3 3 which the Court recently reaffirmed
in Thomas v. Review Board.3 4 The Sherbert case varied significantly from the usual case of inadvertent regulatory interference
with religiously motivated conduct. In Sherbert the plaintiff had
lost her job, and she refused to accept available employment that
would require work on Saturdays in violation of her religious beliefs. The state employment security commission denied her request for unemployment compensation because of her refusal to
accept the available employment that entailed Saturday work. In a
part of the decision with potential implications far beyond the religion clauses, the Court first held that withholding a state benefit
because of religiously motivated conduct imposed a penalty on the
religious conduct that was the conceptual equivalent of a regulatory fine.35 The Court then held that the penalty violated the free
exercise clause because the state could not meet the heavy burden
of justification usually imposed in regulatory interference cases
36
such as Yoder.
From a political oppression point of view, the result in Sherbert is particularly interesting because the state interference with
religion was doubly inadvertent. First, the challenged state action
31. Id. at 215.
32. Id. at 234; accord Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). For a case in which the
Court held that the government's interest met the high standard of justification required for

a direct regulatory interference with religiously motivated conduct, see Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In Gillette the Court held that the federal government's interest
in raising and fielding an army justified forcing draftees to serve in spite of their religious

objections to participation in the Vietnam War. Id. at 461-62.
33.
34.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
450 U.S. 707 (1981).

35. 374 U.S. at 404.
36.

Id. at 409.
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was a financial aid program that only inadvertently produced a
regulatory impact. Only through the Court's penalty analysis does
the withholding of a benefit produce an interference with freedom
that is equivalent to the fine that usually accompanies a direct regulatory interference with freedom. Second, the regulation only inadvertently affected religion. The "regulation" was apparently the
legislature's good faith attempt to distribute the state benefits to
those truly in need, excluding those who merely chose not to work.
The only impact on religious liberty occurred because the plaintiff's refusal of employment in this case happened to be religiously
motivated. Nonetheless, the Court applied the highest level of judicial scrutiny, or the strongest standard of justification, in striking
down the state's restriction on unemployment compensation as a
violation of the free exercise clause.
The lesson of Sherbert seems to be that the Court can find a
significant threat of political oppression of religious minorities in
the very inadvertence of the state legislatures. The Court is aware,
at least intuitively, that the state legislature never would have imposed the regulation in cases like Yoder, or the qualification on
benefits in cases like Sherbert, if the legislature had been controlled by members of the objecting religious minority. Thus, in a
very real way the legislature's insensitivity to or disregard of a minority's religious beliefs constitutes the regulatory imposition of
the majority's religious beliefs on the minority. The regulation or
the qualification of benefits unavoidably incorporates an implicit
religious value judgment and implements the majority's religious
37
beliefs.
On the other hand, the Court does not always perceive a serious threat of political oppression in the inadvertence of the legislature when, rather than prohibiting the religiously motivated conduct, the legislature simply has made it more difficult, more costly,
or less convenient. In recent cases similar to Sherbert the Court
had claimed to be applying strict scrutiny to the burden imposed
on religious conduct, but has found that state justifications that do
not seem compelling in the usual strict sense have been sufficient.
For example, Bob Jones University v. United States38 concerned a
free exercise challenge to an Internal Revenue Service policy that
denied otherwise available tax benefits to any private school that
37. See Pepper, 'Quaring' May Help the Supreme Court Clarify Religious Freedom
Doctrine, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 1985, at 24, Col. 1.
38. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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engaged in racial discrimination. Because sincere religious belief
dictated Bob Jones University's discriminatory actions, the Supreme Court announced that the penalty imposed on those actions
by the withdrawal of tax benefits would be subject to the compelling interest test. The Court then found that the federal government's compelling interest in eliminating racial discrimination in
education justified burdening Bob Jones University's religious freedom. 3 9 If the challenged federal action had been a direct regulation
flatly prohibiting Bob Jones University from engaging in religiously motivated racial discrimination, the Court might well have
found the government's interest somewhat less compelling. The
ease with which the Court found the government's interest to be
"compelling" probably rests partially on the fact that the challenged governmental action left the University entirely free to exercise its religious preference for racial discrimination as long as
the University was willing to forfeit the tax benefit in question.
Similarly, in United States v. Lee' 0 the Court found that the
imposition of a social security tax on Amish employers was justified by a governmental interest strong enough to outweigh a religious ban on the payment of such taxes. A close reading of the
Court's opinion in Lee confirms the impression that the Court used
some standard of review less rigorous than the compelling interest
test. The opinion also indicates that at least one reason for less
rigorous scrutiny is that the challenged governmental action did
not completely prohibit the Amish from implementing this particular religious belief. After citing Wisconsin v. Yoder and Sherbert
v. Verner for the proposition that the government "may justify a
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest, '41 the Court concluded that the government's interest in this case was "very
high.' 4 2 Conspicuously missing from the opinion was any mention
of a "compelling" governmental interest. Rather, the general drift
of the opinion seemed to emphasize the implication of the word
"overriding" that the government's interest should be balanced
against the extent of the interference with religious freedom. In
view of the Court's conspicious avoidance of the absolutist "compelling interest" language in favor of the more relativist "overriding interest" formulation and the ease with which the Court found
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 604.
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 259.
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that standard met, the Court seemingly imposed something less
than the strictest review.
The explanation for this somewhat reduced scrutiny can be
found at least partially in the Court's observation that the imposition of the social security tax was not a direct total prohibition on
the exercise of the religious ban against paying the tax. According
to the Court's analysis, the Amish employers had entered into
commercial activity and thus had incurred social security tax liability "as a matter of choice. ' 43 If the Amish employers wished to
exercise their religious preference to avoid these taxes, they could
do so simply by forfeiting the economic gain derived from the particular forms of commercial activity that gave rise to the tax
liability.44
IV.

THE UsUAL NONDISCRIMINATORY GOVERNMENTAL AID TO

RELIGION CASE: A LESSER RISK OF POLITICAL OPPRESSION

According to current doctrine that distinguishes between the
two religion clauses, governmental benefits to religion are subject
to challenge under the establishment clause. The Court routinely
invokes the tripartite test set out in Walz v. Tax Commission of
the City of New York 45 as the standard of review to evaluate the
constitutionality of governmental aid to religion. The 1980 case of
Committee for Public Educationand Religious Liberty v. Regan, e
which set the stage for the Court's most recent encounters with
governmental schemes benefiting religion, 47 provides a typical example of the Walz tripartite test in operation. In Regan the Court
43. Id. at 261.
44. The Court has indicated recently that a lower scrutiny than the compelling interest test may be applied even in cases of inadvertent direct regulatory interference with religious conduct if the regulation merely makes the conduct more difficult or less convenient,
but does not prohibit it altogether. For example, in Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981), the Court confronted a state regulation prohibiting anyone from engaging in solicitation at the state fair outside of properly designated
fixed locations. Because the Krishna religion requires solicitation in public places, the
Krishnas challenged the regulation confining their activities to fixed locations at the fair as
a violation of the free exercise clause. Recognizing that the solicitation was "protected by
the First Amendment," id. at 647, the Court analogized the regulation to a "time, place, and
manner" restriction on free speech. According to the Court, those restrictions are constitutionally valid providing "that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in
doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."
Id. at 648.
45. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
46. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
47. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105
S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
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upheld a New York statute that allowed state funds to be used to
reimburse both secular and sectarian private schools for the costs
48
of state-required testing and reporting services.
First, the Court found that the New York statute was intended to serve the secular purpose of enhancing educational opportunity. 49 The Court found no indication that the legislature intended the statute to advance either the interests of one religion
over another or the interest of religion over nonreligion. Second,
the Court held that the primary actual effect of the statute was not
the advancement of religion. 50 The Court found no significant risk
that the state-supported examinations could be used for religious
indoctrination.51 Third, the statute did not involve the state in excessive entanglement with religion or religious activities. The statute's monitoring system did not require daily surveillance or intrusive inspections of the religious schools by state officers. Because
the financial arrangements were discrete and identifiable, entanglement was minimal.52
The first step in the tripartite analysis, checking for a secular
legislative purpose, simply weeds out those relatively few cases
that involve a per se violation of the establishment clause. 53 As
noted above, any state program that was intended specifically to
advance either one religion over another or religion over nonreligion would constitute a per se violation.54 Not surprisingly, these
cases are relatively rare. The usual case reaching the Court involves a program with an obvious secular purpose (such as the
48.
49.
50.
51.

444 U.S. at 648.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 656. The Court held that there was no constitutionally significant distinction

between paying public employees or independent workers to grade standardized tests and
paying a private school to have its teachers do the same thing. This outcome would change
if the legislation did not adequately prevent misuse of reimbursements, but the challenged
statute had sufficient protection.

52. Id. at 659-60. In his dissent Justice Blackmun applied the tripartite test and concluded that the New York statute had the primary effect of advancing religion and created
excessive entanglement. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This difference in application
is not as significant as the recognition that the tripartite test governed the disposition of the
case. Eight members of the Court agreed that the tripartite test was appropriate to define
the contours of permissible nondiscriminatory aid to religious organizations. Mr. Justice
Stevens dissented and advocated the return of an impregnable wall between church and
state. Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He suggested that there was no consistent rationale underlying the school cases, and he summarily concluded that the challenged subsidies

violated the establishment clause. Id.
53.
54.

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2500 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying note 26.
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standardization of educational programs) and an inadvertent benefit to religion (such as paying the cost of an educational program
that the religious schools otherwise would fund on their own).
Thus, for all practical purposes, the second and third steps in the
Walz analysis effectively embody the standard of judicial review
applicable to state programs that inadvertently aid religion. 55
A close analysis of the second and third Walz factors and the
way the Court applies them in cases like Regan confirms that the
operative factor in these state aid to religion cases is the Court's
concern about the level of risk of political oppression along religious lines. The Walz second and third factors taken together
serve the same function in establishment clause analysis that the
compelling interest test serves in free exercise clause analysis. The
"bipartite" Walz test, however, imposes far less rigorous judicial
scrutiny than that applied under the compelling interest rhetoric
in the usual free exercise case. This difference in the level of judicial scrutiny exists because state programs that inadvertently aid
religion generally present a much lower risk of political oppression
than regulatory interferences with religious conduct.
Furthermore, it seems more than coincidence that in scrutinizing the primary effect of a state scheme pursuant to the second
element of the Walz test, the Court most often seems concerned
about the possibility that a religious institution will divert state
aid to support religious indoctrination.56 Of all the religious activities that a state might inadvertently aid, religious indoctrination
involves the greatest likelihood of religious oppression. In a sense,
even the recipients of state-aided religious indoctrination are
55. But see Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985) (discussed supra note 26).
In that case the Court found a violation of the establishment clause in the "primary effect"
of advancing a particular religious practice rather than in the single and obvious purpose of
the legislature to produce that effect.
56. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825
(1973).
There is a catch-22 between aid and supervision. Too little state supervision of religious
schools' use of public support may cause a program to fail the primary effect test. Enough
supervision to insure a secular primary effect may cause a program to fail the excessive
entanglement test. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975). The amount of supervision needed to insure no indoctrination may vary with the age
of students. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973) (striking state aid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools) with Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (upholding congressional program to aid colleges
and universities) ("There is substance to the contention that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination.").

19861

RELIGION CLAUSES

themselves the victims of politically imposed religion. More importantly, the process of vigorous indoctrination ultimately is responsible for expanding the numbers of any religious group and thereby
enhancing the social and political influence of that particular religion. Thus, while the Walz test is less rigorous than the usual free
exercise test because of the lessened risk of political oppression in
a Walz case, the primary effect element of the Walz test is most
vigorous in those Walz cases when the risk of political oppression
is greatest.
Finally, the remaining element of the Walz test, the requirement that any state aid scheme avoid "excessive entanglement,"
embodies the same underlying concern about political oppression.
Although the entanglement rhetoric has appeared lately in a variety of contexts and seems to change meaning with the context, the
notion of entanglement in state aid cases seems to refer primarily
to the state's efforts to enforce the conditions and qualifications
that accompany the usual grant of aid. The Court to some extent
may be concerned about the simple association between state enforcement personnel and the religious institution whose actions are
being monitored. 7 More likely, the central concern expressed in
the entanglement language relates to the regulatory effect of the
conditions the state attaches to the aid and to the regulatory effect
of the state's efforts to enforce those conditions. 5 8 In Sherbert v.
Verner59 the Court clearly ruled that conditioning the receipt of
state aid on the recipient's modification of her religiously motivated conduct constituted a regulatory interference with religious
liberty and called forth the strictest judicial scrutiny.60 Not surprisingly then, state regulatory involvement that accompanies state
aid to religion calls forth the most vigorous judicial intervention
available in a state aid case under the Walz doctrine of
entanglement.
57. See Aguilar 105 S. Ct. at 3239.
58. In the Court's most recent encounter with the entanglement problem, the Court
stated:
The principle that the state should not become too closely entangled with the church
in the administration of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When the state becomes
enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious signficiance, the freedom
of religious belief of those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers. . . . In
addition, the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters.
Id. at 3237.
59. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
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The net effect of the Walz test, both as articulated and as applied, is to strike down state aid programs when they present a
significant risk of political oppression on religious lines while preserving those aid programs that do not present this risk.
V. THE RELIGIOUS

DISCRIMINATION CASE:

A

GREATER RISK OF

POLITICAL OPPRESSION

A. DiscriminatoryInfringement of Religious Liberty
As noted earlier, a regulatory interference with religiously motivated conduct calls forth the most vigorous judicial scrutiny because regulatory restrictions on religious freedom pose the most direct threat of political oppression of religion.6 1 A regulatory

measure that discriminates between religions would seem to present an even greater risk of political oppression than that
presented by an evenhanded regulation.2 Thus, an assessment of
the risk of political oppression would lead one to predict that a
discriminatory interference with religiously motivated conduct
would receive the strictest possible judicial scrutiny no matter
what doctrinal construct the court might choose to articulate. The
Court's response to the problem presented in Larson v. Valente8
confirms the accuracy of this prediction.
In Larson the Court confronted a Minnesota regulation intended to protect the public from fraudulent solicitation of charitable contributions. The state required charitable organizations
covered by the act to register with the Minnesota Department of
Commerce prior to soliciting contributions 6 and to file extensive
reports of financial operations. 5 Prior to 1978, the state exempted
all religious organizations from the registration and reporting requirements.66 Under a 1978 amendment, the state restricted the

exemption for religious organizations to those organizations that
received more than half their total revenues from members or affil61. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
62. See supra text accompanying note 37, which suggests that all regulatory measures
that impact on religion are "discriminatory" in that the measure would never have been
passed if the impacted religious minority had been a political majority. If the Court finds, as
it did in Sherbert, a serious risk of political oppression in inadvertent discrimination, it
follows that overt discrimination would raise a greater risk of political oppression of a religious minority.
63. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
64. Id. at 231.
65. Id.

66. Id.
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iated organizations. 7 Members of the Holy Spirit Association for
the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) challenged the fifty percent rule as a violation of the Constitution. 8
Applying strict scrutiny to the Minnesota act, the majority held
that the act must be justified by a compelling state interest and
must be closely fitted to advance that interest.6 9 The Court assumed, arguendo,that prevention of fraud was an adequately compelling state interest,70 but Justice Brennan's opinion concluded
that the fifty percent rule was not fitted closely enough to the asserted interest.7 1 Thus, the act failed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny standard, and the Court held that the fifty percent distinction was unconstitutional.
Most notable about the Larson case is the doctrinal construct
the Court used to articulate its result. In effect, the Court said
that, for free exercise clause purposes, the state could justify its
interference with religious liberty by showing a compelling state
interest in preventing fraudulent solicitation. The Court then
could have proceeded to question the inequality in the regulatory
interference as a matter of equal protection. Under the fundamental rights branch of equal protection, 2 the Court would have applied the compelling interest test to the inequality and found that
the inequality did not meet the second element of the compelling
67. Id. at 231-32.
68. Plaintiffs claimed that the act "constituted an abridgment of their First Amendment rights of expression and free exercise of religion, as well as a denial of their right to
equal protection of the laws .... " Id. at 233.
69. Id. at 247.
70. Id. at 248.
71. Id. at 251. The Court rejected the argument that the 50% rule distinguished between religious groups that were able to prevent fraudulent solicitations and religious organizations that were not. The Court also dismissed three premises that supported the state's
argument. According to the state's first premise, members of groups exempted by the act
could and would supervise and control solicitations. Justice Brennan responded by noting
both that the record contained no evidence to support the first premise and that the legislative history of the act suggested a contrary conclusion. Id. at 249-50. According to the second premise, membership control provided an adequate safeguard against fraudulent practices. Justice Brennan responded, again noting the absence of evidence showing why the line
should be drawn at 50% and stating that the act assumed that religious organizations could
not prevent fraudulent activities. Id. at 250. According to the final premise, the need for
disclosure increased with the percentage of nonmember contributions. The Court rejected
this premise, noting that raw amounts rather than percentages more plausibly governed the
state interest in disclosure. The Court suggested that the public has a greater interest in
disclosure from a church that raises $10 million, 20% of which comes from nonmembers,
than a church that raises $50 thousand, 60% of which comes from nonmembers. Id. at 251.
72. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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interest test for the reasons the Court articulated in the opinion.
Rather than characterize the discrimination in the regulation
as an equal protection problem, however, the Court chose to characterize the regulatory discrimination as an establishment clause
problem. In effect, the Court assigned an equal protection role to
the establishment clause in cases of unequal regulatory interference with religiously motivated conduct." Such a doctrinal construct in itself should not be surprising because the essence of governmental establishment of religion is the discriminatory
disfavoring of other religions or of nonreligion. What is particularly
telling about the Larson construct is that, after assigning the case
to the establishment clause, the Court proceeded to apply strict
scrutiny with no precedent in establishment clause doctrine. The
Court indirectly acknowledged its lack of doctrinal underpinnings
when it lamely attempted to draw on elements of the Walz tripartite test to justify the holding of the case. 4 Nothing in traditional
establishment clause doctrine would have led one to anticipate the
application of strict scrutiny in Larson. Viewing the religion
clauses as a single comprehensive prohibition against any unacceptable risk of political oppression of religion, however, would
have led to the prediction that the Court would apply strict scrutiny in Larson even if Larson were characterized as an establishment clause problem.
B.

DiscriminatoryAid or Benefit

In the recent case of Lynch v. Donnelly 5 the Court upheld the
municipal financing and display of a nativity scene. For many
years the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, in cooperation with its
downtown retail merchant's association, created a Christmas display to help celebrate the Christmas holiday season. The display
was located in the hub of the business community and was similar
to displays in many other communities.7 6 The display included:
many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas,
including, .

.

. Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers,

cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a
73. For a discussion of the equal protection aspects of the establishment clause, see
Note, Another Brick in the Wall: Denominational Preferences and Strict Scrutiny Under
The Establishment Clause, 62 NEB. L. REv. 359, 371-72 (1983).
74. 456 U.S. at 251-55.
75. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
76. Id. at 671.
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teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASON'S
77
GREETINGS," and the creche at issue here.

The city owned all the components of the display. The lower
courts held that the inclusion of a creche in the Christmas display
violated the establishment clause. 78 The Supreme Court reversed
and held that the public display of the creche was not
unconstitutional. 9
The Court began its analysis by exploring the possibility of an
historic exception to the usual tripartite establishment clause analysis.80 Apparently unable to rest on the historical exception notion,
the Court shifted from historical background to analytical background. The Chief Justice noted that the Court has never accepted
a rigid, mechanical approach to establishment clause cases.8 1
Rather, he noted that the Court favors scrutinizing legislation to
determine whether it establishes religion or religious faith.8 2 The
Court then purported to adopt the Walz tripartite test to determine whether the municipal sponsorship of the creche established
religion. In fact, however, no existing standard of review was entirely appropriate. Unlike the apparently evenhanded benefit in
Regan,83 the state benefit in Lynch discriminated in favor of Christian religions and against all others. Certainly the risk of political
77. Id.
78. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.R.I. 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir.
1982).
79. 465 U.S. at 687. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the tripartite
test did not apply to discrimination cases. Citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the
court held that discrimination cases should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Donnelly v.
Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1034 (1st Cir. 1982). Thus, the First Circuit linked uneven benefit
and uneven regulatory interference cases and applied the same test, thereby highlighting the
equal protection aspect of the establishment clause. The Supreme Court, in reversing the
First Circuit and in applying the tripartite test, rejected this consistent equal protection
approach and apparently relied instead on the distinction between regulatory schemes and
benefit schemes.
80. The Court noted that the Congress that enacted the first amendment also authorized the use of public funds to pay for legislative chaplains. The Court also noted the long
history of official recognition of Thanksgiving, Christmas, and the Jewish Holy Days. In
addition, the Court cited as examples of religious accommodation our national motto, "In
God we trust," and the language "One nation under God," which is contained in the Pledge
of Allegiance to the American Flag. The Court also pointed out that publicly supported art
galleries, including the National Gallery in Washington, D.C., display many paintings that
contain religious themes or messages. Finally, the Court recognized that its own chamber
contained religious symbols. Concluding this historical background, Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion asserted that countless other examples of religious accommodation could
be listed. 465 U.S. at 677.
81. Id. at 678.
82. Id.
83. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:249

oppression along religious lines is greater in such a case than in a
case of benefits equally available to all religions. On the other
hand, the risk of oppression in an unequal benefits case does not
rise to the level presented by a regulatory impairment of religious
freedom challenged under the free exercise clause. Thus, in Lynch
the Court was left without a readily applicable doctrinal construct.
Without an appropriate doctrinal construct and without an explicit consciousness of the values underlying the previous religion
clause decisions, the Court floundered in Lynch. To reach the conclusion that the city had a valid secular purpose for the creche, the
Court focused on the creche's position in the context of the Christmas holiday."4 The Court evaluated the primary effect element of
the test by comparing the instant case to previous cases. The Court
listed eight permissible governmental benefits to religion that the
85
Court said were no less significant than the creche display. Six of
the examples were drawn from cases concerning evenhanded benefits to religion. The seventh example was drawn from Marsh v.
Chambers,s6 which the Court decided on the basis of an historic
8 7
exception to the otherwise applicable establishment clause tests.
Thus, only one of the examples cited was arguably a significant
84. The Court accepted the city's claim that the secular purpose of the display was to
recognize the historic origins of the national holiday. The Court noted that the city argued
that the display had an exclusively secular purpose. 465 U.S. at 681 n.6. Presumably the city
took the position that the display was sponsored exclusively to increase the business in the
downtown shopping district. The Court distinguished Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980),
and Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), on the ground that the religious
accommodation in those cases had no secular purpose. In Stone the Court had invalidated
the posting of the Ten Commandments on public classroom walls because the posting was
purely religious. In Abington the Court had invalidated Bible readings in public schools
because there was no educational or secular aspect to the readings.
85. 465 U.S. at 681-82. The Court stated that:
[To conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is to advance religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause would require that we view it as more beneficial
to and more an endorsement of religion, for example, than expenditure of large sums of
public money for textbooks supplied throughout the country to students attending
church-sponsored schools; expenditure of public funds for transportation of students to
church-sponsored schools; federal grants for college buildings of church-sponsored institutions of higher education combining secular and religious education; noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities; and the tax exemptions for
church properties sanctioned in Walz. It would also require that we view it as more of
an endorsement of religion than the Sunday Closing Laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland; the release time program for religious training in Zorach; and the legislative
prayers upheld in Marsh.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
86. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 94-104 for a discussion of Marsh and the historic exception.
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unequal benefit that the Court previously had held constitutional. s8 The Court then buttressed this analysis by contrasting
two examples of evenhanded benefits previously held invalid. 9
Concluding the tripartite test analysis, the majority found no excessive administrative or political entanglement.90
The majority and concurring opinions strove mightily to fit
this unequal benefits case to the tripartite test and actually applied the tolerant level of judicial scrutiny usually associated with
the tripartite test rhetoric. Justice Brennan in dissent, however,
seemed to realize that such a low level of scrutiny was inappropriate. Nonetheless, he too embraced the tripartite test rhetoric without questioning the appropriateness of applying a doctrinal construct drawn from evenhanded benefits cases. 9' Because he sensed
the greater risk of political oppression, he applied a stricter tripartite test and was able to find a violation of the establishment
clause. 2 Without a unifying theory, however, Justice Brennan was
unable to square his analysis adequately with previous cases.
All the opinion writers attempted to use a test designed for
cases with a lower level risk of political oppression. This resulted
in confusion and dickering about the application of the tripartite
test. The Court's approach not only led to a faulty result in the
88. The one arguably appropriate citation is McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961), upholding Sunday closing laws. Because the politically dominante religions consider
Sunday their day of worship while several minority religious do not, the Sunday closing laws
present the same sort of uneven benefit problem that the municipal creche in Lynch
presents. The Court's doctrinal analysis in McGowan, however, contains the same flaw that
the Court perpetuated in Lynch-the failure to note that uneven benefit cases present a risk
of political oppression along religious lines that exceeds the risk presented by evenhanded
benefit cases. The perspective advanced in this Article clearly demonstrates the inconsistency between the McGowan holding and the rest of the Court's holdings on religion clause
questions. Thus, the theory of political oppression gives doctrinal form to the intuitive dissatisfaction and critical comment that has attended the McGowan decision.
89. 465 U.S. at 682-83.
90. On the excessive entanglement issue, the majority accepted the lower court's conclusion that there was an acceptable lack of contact, sponsorship, and day-to-day interaction. The Court refused to hold that political divisiness alone amounted to excessive entanglement, but concluded that the history of the creche display failed to indicate political
disharmony. Id. at 684.
91. Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Justice Brennan concluded that there was no secular purpose for including the
creche in the Christmas display. He focused on the criche rather than the display as a
whole. Because the criche could be separated from the rest of the display with no impairment to the secular purpose, inclusion of the creche showed approval of the particular religious beliefs symbolized by the creche and thus violated the purpose element of the tripartite test. Brennan also held that the criche would result in excessive entanglement because
excessive contacts and political divisiveness would result from non-Christian groups petitioning for their share of the government's support. Id. at 698-704.
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case, but also distorted the tripartite test for future equal benefits
cases. Had the Court directly assessed the risk of political oppression along religious lines, it would have realized that judicial scrutiny of discriminatory benefits should be stricter than the scrutiny
of nondiscriminatory benefits. A direct assessment of the risk of
political oppression of religion in Lynch would have dictated a test
that is stronger
than the test in Regan93 and weaker than the test
94
in Larson.

VI. THE DE

MINIMIS REGULATION OR AID CASE: AN ACCEPTABLE

RISK OF POLITICAL OPPRESSION

In Marsh v. Chambers95 the Court clearly established the existence of an historic exception to what otherwise would be applicable religion clause doctrine. Marsh concerned a challenge to the
practice of the Nebraska legislature of opening each legislative session with a prayer delivered by the state's official chaplain. The
chaplain theoretically was selected biannually but the same person
had held the position since 1965.96 The state paid a salary for the
chaplain's services. This entire scheme was attacked on establishment clause grounds. The district court had held that the opening
prayer was constitutional, but that paying the chaplain from public
funds violated the establishment clause.97 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the entire scheme
failed all three elements of the tripartite test.98 The Supreme
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that Nebraska's policy
of paying a chaplain to open legislative sessions with prayer did
not violate the establishment clause.
The majority rested its decision on the fact that the risk of
offending first amendment interests was de minimis. Justice Burger's majority opinion supported this conclusion with an examination of the unique historical acceptance of legislative prayer. He
explained that both continental and colonial congresses opened
sessions with prayers delivered by official chaplains. 99 He noted
that even the drafters of the first amendment paid chaplains to
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
463 U.S. 783 (1983); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
463 U.S. at 784-85.
Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1980).
Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982).
463 U.S. at 786-91.
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open legislative sessions with prayer. 100 The majority opinion failed
to apply either the tripartite test or the strict scrutiny test. In fact,
after the Court found sufficient historical support for legislative
prayer, the Court applied no test at all. The conclusion that there
was no constitutional violation flowed directly from the Court's
historical analysis. On the opposite side, Justice Brennan in dissent concluded that Nebraska's actions violated the tripartite
test,10 1 the strict scrutiny test,10 2 and his own Schempp test.10 3 Justice Brennan concluded his opinion with an attack on the historic
04
exception itself.1
Both the majority and dissenting views are best explained by
reference to the perceived risk of political oppression of
nonrepresented religions or nonreligion. The majority intuitively
applied the political oppression criterion and concluded that history proved there was no risk of oppression in Nebraska's actions
even though the practice would fail the most tolerant version of
the Walz tripartite test. On the other hand, Justice Brennan's dissent almost expressly adopted risk of political oppression as the
operative criterion. Contrary to the majority's more sanguine view,
Justice Brennan concluded that legislative prayer forces unwarranted participation in religion, requires state residents to support
a religion they do not believe in, degrades religion by using it to
call a secular body to order, and politicizes religion.105 The majority and the dissent in Marsh differed precisely in their assessment
of the risk of political oppression presented by the challenged state
action. Without an awareness of the determinative role of the political oppression criterion, evaluating either opinion in Marsh is
difficult.
100. Id. at 788 & n.7. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be
no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part
of the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an "establishment" of religion or a step
toward establishment, it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country.
Id. at 792.
101.

Id. at 795-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

102.

Id. at 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

103. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 813-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105.

Id. at 808 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

If, as this Article argues, the religion clauses have a single underlying purpose, the two clauses should be read and applied as a
single conceptual unit, a single constitutional restriction on government. In effect, this Article suggests that a new constitutional
holding of "in violation of the religion clause" should be substituted for the existing doctrines under which a court finds a violation of either the establishment clause or the free exercise clause.
The risk of political oppression on religious lines should be the criterion by which any governmental action should be measured when
challenged under the religion clause.
When a governmental action is challenged as a violation of the
religion clause because the action presents some risk of political
oppression, the Court should strike down that action unless the
government is able to demonstrate an interest sufficient to outweigh the risk of oppression. The assessment of the risk of political
oppression and the competing governmental interest offered as justification in any specific case should proceed without reference to
current establishment and free exercise categories. The Court's
conscious endorsement of such an approach would provide a satisfying explanation for a large number of results previously arrived
at by intuition and would provide a theoretical basis from which
one could predict results in future cases.

